INTRODUCTION
Bank liquidity theory holds that banks must hold large amount of liquid assets as reserves against
possible demand for payment by depositors. This theory emphasizes the need for holding short
term assets as a prudent cushion in the face of various uncertainties in banking operations and the
various functions of bank liquidity. The level of liquid assets of a bank depends on the banks
perceived need for liquidity. The volatility of deposits and the state of the money market as well
as the level and direction of the monetary policy of the government influence bank liquidity.
According to Nwankwo (1990a,1990b,1993) liquidity management focuses on the liability side
of the balance sheet for supplemental liquidity. Liquidity management theory argues that since
large banks can buy all the funds they need, there is no need to store liquidity on the assets side
of the balance sheet. This theory assumes that increases in interest rates offered for funds will
lead to increases in funds supply under a normal and stable situation, with unshaken confidence
of the money market on the credit worthiness, viability and integrity of the borrowing bank.
Liquidity risk management entails the construction of loan assets in such a way that outflows of
funds can be accommodated without making an adjustment in liability. It involves a skilled
treatment of liquidity to support the bank’s loan assets or assets growth as well as maintaining a
certain level of fluidity in the assets in order to meet potential demand for liquidity. Every bank
has a corporate goal. The goal may be the maximization of profit for the shareholders or the
maximization of their investment or total wealth in the bank. Whatever may be the objective the
need to maintain adequate liquidity cannot be over emphasized. Bank liquidity risk is a risk of
loss to a bank arising from the bank not having adequate funds to meet deposit withdrawals and
loan demands. This risk is a very serious one since it strikes at the credibility and confidence
reposed in the bank. A liquidity risk can precipitate a run on a bank. Once there is a run there is a
good likelihood that the bank would be insolvent since no bank can withstand a sustained run on
its deposits. To be successful bank management attempts to minimize liquidity risk and in effect
losses arising there from. This is imperative because finance theory argues that there is a positive
linear relationship between risk and return. By implication, the higher the risk the higher the
return and vice versa. In the context of liquidity, the higher the liquidity position of a bank, the
less risky is the bank, and of course the more successful the bank will be. For many years in
Nigeria a good number of banks have had acute liquidity risk challenges, became distressed and
eventually failed. In the 1990s for instance, most of the state governments – owned commercial
banks were not only undercapitalized but were also found to be financially distressed. Bad,
doubtful and lost loans, advances, and discounts (LAD) eroded the capital of many banks, and
they were unable to meet depositors’ demands for cash withdrawals. In spite of the financial
problems, some well managed banks made profits in the 1990s. Those that failed were the ones
that could not provide adequate liquidity risk management. They carried LAD exposures well in
excess of their gross deposit liabilities, they equally failed to make adequate provision for their
toxic assets, and also ignored disclosure requirements in relation to off-balance sheet
engagements, like bonds and guarantees. Such practices tended to give false comfort and to delay
the recognition of the need to enforce effective liquidity risk management that would address the
problems they faced in the interest of owners, depositors and the financial system. Because of the
problems posed by these adverse conditions and in order to ensure a sound financial system
generally, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced the prudential guidelines. The
prudential guidelines are the totality of the rules and regulations to be adopted for the
classification of banks assets (Onoh, 2002, Sanusi, 1994, Ahmad, & Alashi, 1992). Banks as
custodians of depositors funds are expected to exercise care and prudence in their lending
operations. The banks that failed in Nigeria in 2011 like the Intercontinental Bank, Afribank,
Oceanic Bank, Bank PHB, Finbank, and others, like Gulfbank that failed earlier on, had liquidity
risk problems. Bank liquidity risk management as a matter of fact involves a mix of different
approaches since no single approach has been evolved in order to enhance either short term or
long term liquidity position of a bank. Bank liquidity risk management theory believes that
increase in liabilities should be made in such a way that the net rate of return on the investment
of such funds remains positive. The theory is based on the idea that given an investment
opportunity funds could be acquired in the money market to meet emergency investment
opportunities. The liquidity of a bank could be increased through the dynamic efforts of
management which involves borrowing from different sources, including interbank borrowing.
According to McNutt, et al (2011), liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009.
Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing which are stable
sources of financing continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid
assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-
balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit
origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. They opine that banks
should hold cash and other liquid assets as part of their overall strategy to manage liquidity risk.
In modern banks, liquidity risk stems more from exposure to undrawn loan commitments, the
withdrawal of fund from wholesale deposits and the loss of other sources of short term financing.
Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) show that liquidity risk exposure is not only negatively correlated
with loan growth in time of crisis but it is also positively correlated with the growth in liquid
assets and again the financial crisis of 2007-2009 which is the biggest shock to the US and
World Wide financial system since the 1930s offers a unique challenge to both financial
institutions’ and regulators understanding of liquidity production and liquidity risk management.
The financial crisis only abated when private capital was brought into the system. This suggests
that liquidity production is central to all theories of financial intermediation, and asymmetric
information processing allows banks to create liquidity through their asset transformation
function (Diamond and Dybrig, 1983). Banks provide liquidity to borrowers in the form of credit
lines and to depositors by making funds available on demand. These functions leave banks
vulnerable to systemic increases in demand for liquidity from borrowers and at the extreme can
result in runs on banks by depositors. In the traditional framework of banking, runs can be
prevented or at least mitigated by insuring deposits and by requiring banks to issue equity and to
hold cash reserves. Systemic increases in demand for liquidity from borrowers in contrast depend
on external market conditions and thus are harder for individual banks to manage internally. For
example, when the supply of overall market liquidity falls, borrowers turn to banks en masse to
draw funds from existing credit lines (Gatev and Strahan, 2006). Diamond and Rajan (2001b)
state that while banks provide necessary liquidity to borrowers, the loans themselves are
relatively illiquid assets for banks. Consequently, when banks require liquidity they could sell
the loans, in terms of existing collateral held (Bhattachaya and Thakor, 1993). According to
Diamond and Rajan (2001b) banks can ration credit if future liquidity needs are likely to be high.
They suggest that banks can be fragile because they must provide liquidity to depositors on
demand and because they hold illiquid loans. They insist that demands by depositors can occur at
undesirable times, like when loan repayments are uncertain and when there are negative
aggregate liquidity shocks. Also, Kashyap, et al (2002) find similarities between some off-
balance sheet assets and on-balance sheet assets. They suggest that an off-balance sheet loan
commitment becomes an on-balance sheet loan when the borrower chooses to draw on the
commitment. Bergar and Bouwman (2009) find that about half of the liquidity creation at
commercial banks, occurs through these off-balance sheet commitments. Thus, banks stand
ready to supply liquidity to both borrowers and insured retail depositors and can enjoy synergies
when depositors fund loan commitments. Gatev, et al (2009) find that deposits effectively hedge
liquidity risk inherent in unused loan commitment, particularly during periods of tight liquidity.
The loan-liquidity relationship is in tandem with the commercial loan theory which postulates
that a major part of the liabilities of commercial banks always has been of short term nature.
Thus, the trend of acquisition of commercial banks assets should indicate a predominant position
for assets of short term duration. This is based on the assumption that commercial banks should
grant only loans of short-term duration and which should be productive as well as self-
liquidating. Although previous studies found a relationship between bank credit risk production
and liquidity risk exposure there was no specific result linking poor bank liquidity risk
management and bank failures. The liquidity problems of Nigerian banks, was compounded by
the incidence of low capital base. The role of bank equity capital plays a part in the liquidity
provision of commercial banks. Equity capital can act as a buffer to protect depositors in times of
distress especially in periods when regulators would want to increase capital levels to reduce the
threat of bank failures (Gorton and Winton, 2000). Experts believe that there is a profound
relationship between liquidity and profitability. Liquidity of banks in Nigeria is controlled
mainly by a variation of cash reserve and liquidity ratios. The more liquid assets, especially cash,
that are kept, the more resources will be kept idle, hence the lower the income that will be
generated from operations. Managing bank liquidity risk therefore, entails striking a balance
between meeting the customers need for liquidity and the demand to optimize interest earnings
by tying down deposits on other less liquid assets such as loans, advances, and discounts.
Compounding the problems of liquidity risk management is the need to monitor at all times
monetary regulations involving levels of liquidity in order to be able to comply with them. Bank
liquidity risk management equally entails choosing the appropriate mix of deposits that will give
the greatest yield at the least cost. In doing so bank management must avoid mismatch of short
term funds for long term investments. Banks liquidity needs arise from net deposit out flows.
Most withdrawals are predictable because they are either contractually based or follows well-
defined patterns. But most out flows are totally unpredictable. Frequently bank management does
not know whether customers will reinvest maturing fixed deposits and keep the funds with the
bank or out. Also, management cannot predict when loan customers will borrow against open
credit lines. This uncertainty increases the risk that a bank may not have adequate sources of
funds available to meet payment requirements. This risk, in turn, forces management to structure
its portfolio to access liquid funds easily, which lowers potential profits. A well managed bank
monitors its cash position carefully and maintains low liquidity risk. Liquidity risk for a poorly
managed bank closely follows credit and interest rate risks. In many cases, banks that experience
large deposit out flows can often trace the source to either credit risk problems or declined
earnings from interest rate and other “casino” gambles that backfired. Sound liquidity risk
management provides banks an insight on how to monitor the overall risk positions of the bank
such as credit risk and interest rate risk assumed in the banks overall asset and liability
management strategy. If credit risk is high, interest rate risk should be low and vice versa.
Potential liquidity need must reflect estimates of new loan demand and potential deposit losses.
In essence, there is frequently a positive relationship between risk and return, and vice versa. All
over the world, banks are subjected to various degrees of regulation because of their sensitive
nature as custodians of funds and their ability to create money. However, in the Nigerian
perspective, these controls are usually direct and purely administrative, resulting apparently, in
less efficiency in the management and allocation of resources, and also the inability to provide
core banking regulatory leadership. For example, in the early stages of the banking crisis in
Nigeria out of 115 banks, 91 had average liquidity ratio of less than 30 percent between
1995/1996 and average liquidity ratio (ALR) of 0.49 percent bank wide. This was a major
challenge that preceded huge bank failures. (Ogbodo, 1997).
In order to facilitate efficient utilization of loanable funds, every bank is expected to have a
written lending policy which will incorporate guiding principles such as lending risk philosophy
and strategies, loan authorization, approval procedures, desired supporting documentation,
collection procedures, collateral protection against the risk of loss, et cetera. Because the loan
portfolio usually represents the largest risk assets of a bank, bank examiners always undertake an
appraisal of the lending operations of every bank. A major objective of such exercise is to
determine the quality of the credit portfolio and make a quantitative judgment on possible risks
that could lead to losses which bank management should accord due recognition with the view of
protecting shareholders and the banking public. Generally speaking, the expectation of the
regulatory authorities is that banks should grant loans on a sound and collectible basis in order
not to jeopardize depositors’ funds. But the Nigerian perspective over the years shows that banks
fail to establish sound liquidity risk management, lending policies, adequate credit
administration, procedures, failure to monitor lending functions within microfinancial and
macrofinancial guidelines, as well as failure to maintain microfinancial discipline, that result to
poor quality loan assets and the erosion of shareholders funds and bank demise. For example, the
number of banks in Nigeria rose to 119 in 1991, but in 2009, the number crashed to 24, and
further to 21, in 2011, including 3 bridge banks into which the Central Bank of Nigeria injected
about N700bn public funds in a bailout exercise. By this exercise it meant that all of the banks
had acute liquidity risk management problems. Jibueze (2014) reports that the ex-chief executive
officer (CEO) of one of the banks that died in 2011 committed N62b loan fraud and money
laundering. The ex-CEO is accused of fraudulently acquiring the bank PHB’s shares with
depositors funds. He is also accused of applying N3.5bn, being the alleged proceeds of unlawful
loans granted to third parties, and using various companies as fronts with the intention to conceal
the ownership of the loans. These acts run contrary to money laundering (Prohibition) Act and
section 516 of the criminal code Act cap 38, laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). Reckless
granting of loans contravenes section 7(1) (3) of the advanced fee fraud and other fraud related
offences Act and punishable under section 7 (2) (b) of the Act. Omonode (2013) reports that the
ex-CEO of defunct Gulf bank through the use of various faceless companies and in collaboration
with both insiders and outsiders siphoned the funds of the defunct bank in excess of
US$80million. To underscore the fact that there is a positive correlation between bank liquidity
and bank failures, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) established the Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to takeover and manage the toxic assets of the illiquid banks
for effective bank liquidity risk management. The Central Bank of Nigeria determines the Cash
Reserve Requirements of banks. According to Alade (2014) the Central Bank of Nigeria had in
July, 2013 raised the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) for public sector deposits from 38
percent to 50 percent. According to her, the apex bank took time to study banks deposit
composition before implementing the CRR policy. The CRR hike became necessary because of
pockets of liquidity risk issues. Nigeria embarked on banking reforms following a debt crisis in
2008 and 2009 that brought the industry to near collapse. The Central Bank of Nigeria fired eight
chief executive officers of the Nation’s 24 banks and created AMCON to buy lenders bad debts
and stabilize the industry. AMCON spent about N5.6trillion in 2011 to acquire the non-
performing loans of the defunct banks. According to Obi (2013) the nation’s banks have seen
improvements in risk management and corporate governance, resulting in increased lending and
profitability. In the banking system, liquidity risk requires close monitoring because inadequate
liquidity will damage a bank’s reputation while excess liquidity will retard earnings. Therefore,
in measuring liquidity risk, the quality of an asset that enables it to be transformed with
minimum delay into cash should be considered. In Nigeria the Central Bank of Nigeria stipulates
from time to time minimum holdings by deposit money banks (DMBs) as reserves, liquid assets,
special deposits, and stabilization securities. In this regard each bank ensures that its holding of
these items are not less than the amount prescribed by the Central Bank of Nigeria as a measure
against liquidity risk problems (Nzotta, 2004, Nyong, 1994, 1991, Gladin, 1982, Jimoh, 1993)
According to Greuning and Bratanovic (2003) Liquidity is necessary for banks to compensate for
expected and unexpected balance sheet fluctuations and to provide funds for growth. It
represents a bank’s ability to efficiently accommodate the redemption of deposits and other
liabilities and to cover funding increases in the loan and investment portfolio. A bank has
adequate liquidity potential when it can obtain needed funds. The price of liquidity is a function
of market conditions and the markets perception of the inherent riskiness of the borrowing bank.
Liquidity risk management lies at the heart of confidence in the banking system, as commercial
banks are highly leveraged institutions with a ratio of assets to liabilities in the region of 20:1.
The importance of liquidity transcends an individual bank, because a liquidity shortage at a
single bank can have system wide repercussions. Liquidity risk management therefore addresses
market liquidity rather than statutory liquidity. The implication of liquidity risk is that a bank
may have insufficient funds on hand to meet its obligations. A bank’s net funding includes its
maturing assets, existing liabilities, and standby facilities with other institutions. It would sell its
marketable assets in the stable liquidity investment portfolio to meet liquidity requirements only
as a last resort. For a bank to succeed, its liquidity risk must be managed by an asset/liability
committee, which must have a thorough understanding of the interrelationship between liquidity
and other market credit risk exposures on the bank’s balance sheet. Bank liquidity risk
management policies should comprise a risk management structure, a liquidity risk management
and funding strategy, a set of limits to liquidity risk exposures, and a set of procedures for
liquidity risk crises situations. Liquidity needs may be met through liability sources such as
stable deposit base. According to Obieri, (2014) Intercontinental bank failed mainly due to
liquidity risk problems. He states: “In October, 2008, a few months after the start of the global
melt down, the managing director informed the members at a board meeting of serious liquidity
challenges facing the bank. The board members were not informed of any liquidity issues again
until March 2009 when our liquidity problem and that of Oceanic bank became widely known,
especially within the banking circle”. This clear statement pushes the hypothesis that poor bank
liquidity risk management leads to bank failures, because the banks in question failed. Some of
the failed banks were not examined by the CBN for over 5 years, and due to poor liquidity risk
management were driven into involuntary liquidation (Sanusi, 2009, Channon, 1986)
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Statement of the problem
Banks have frequently failed in Nigeria due to acute liquidity risk problems as a result of lack of
sound bank liquidity risk management system. Banks are expected to maintain a certain level of
exposure over their total deposit liabilities so as to be in a comfortable position to meet their
obligations. But in Nigeria banks have often created loans and advances far in excess of their
total deposit liabilities thereby becoming illiquid and unable to meet depositors’ cash withdrawal
demands. Because of poor corporate governance culture most of the failed banks in Nigeria
created too much loans that easily became bad and irrecoverable. To make matters worse, such
bad loans were not classified as required by the prudential guidelines. Banks with state
governments participation and those privately owned were in most cases found wanting in
disclosure requirements. Banks with government interests dished out loans on political
considerations without due processes even with the deliberate intention to declaring them
irrecoverable. The chairman/managing director nomenclature in the privately owned banks made
it easy for bank promoters to use faceless subsidiaries to siphon depositors’ funds. Available data
show that people placed in executive bank positions to chart profitable paths for their banks were
rather engaged in squeezing the banks dry and into total illiquidity. A situation where a bank
CEO would through bad loans allegedly steal about N62b, another one US$80m and yet another
CEO N164million, just to mention few figures among others pose a huge problem for the
banking system as a whole, since the liquidity risk problem of one bank affects the system, The
Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) was created to protect shareholders,
depositors and the financial system, with trillions of Naira, to acquire the non-performing loans
of troubled banks in 2011. In the same year, the Central Bank of Nigeria injected about N700bn
into 3 bridge banks in a liquidity risk bailout exercise with the impression that good liquidity risk
management has a positive correlation with bank success. Microfinancial issues like high
expenditures, fraud and forgeries, manipulation and falsification of accounting records, are
among the issues that militate against bank liquidity risk management and by extension hinder
banking excellence in Nigeria. To solve their liquidity problems Intercontinental bank was
required to “put down” N350billion, and its managing director to refund about N164million. In
the case of Afribank, the managing director was accused of conspiring with others to fleece the
failed bank of about N87.5billion. Because of liquidity problems the Central of Nigeria recently
closed 83 microfinance banks and 101 Bureaux du Change. Nigerian Deposit Insurance
Corporation will use N105bn to pay depositors of the failed microfinance banks (Okoroafor,
2014, Onyekakeyah, 2014, Ojiabor, & Onugu, 2014, Iwarah, 2014, Uzoaga, 1981, Umoh, 1995,
Adekanye, 1986, Ozigbo, 1995, Sullivan, 1988, Tricker, 1984, Zahra & Pearce, 11, 1989).
Delimitation of the study
The study was delimited to Aba and its environs. The choice of Aba is unique because of the
high concentration of business activities and the representation of all the banks in Nigeria in the
areas.
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Limitation of the study
The study was constrained by lack of research grant. However, this limitation did not affect the
quality and result of the study.
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